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EXPANDING JUDICIAL REVIEW TO
ENCOURAGE EMPLOYERS AND
EMPLOYEES TO ENTER THE
ARBITRATION ARENA
ANTHONY J. JACOB*

INTRODUCTION

While working at an Atlantic City convention for Great Western Mortgage Corp., Michele Peacock was the victim of sexual harassment by a Great Western executive.' The executive tried to
force her into bed to get to know her better." Ms. Peacock quit her
job and sued Great Western.8 Although a court would likely have
granted her relief for sexual harassment, she will not receive a
trial.' Before hiring her, Great Western required that Ms. Peacock
sign a contract with a mandatory arbitration agreement.6 Any
dispute that might arise between herself and Great Western would
be settled through binding arbitration.6 She prospectively waived
her right to a judicial remedy by signing the agreement.'
Through the use of such agreements, American dispute resolution has evolved from a predominantly judicial run system' to a
system that now utilizes a variety of methods, including Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR).9 Due to the number of people filing

* J.D. Candidate, 1998.
1. Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 224 (3d Cir. 1997);
Roy Furchgott, The Dotted Line: More Employees Signing ContractsRequiring
Them to Forgo Their Day in Court, CHI. DAILY LAW BULL., July 29, 1996, at 1.
2. Great W. Mortgage Corp., 110 F.3d at 225.
& Id.
4. Furchgott, supra note 1, at 1.
5. Great W. Mortgage Corp., 110 F.3d at 224.
6. Id. at 224-25.
7. Furchgott, supra note 1, at 1.
8. The United States Constitution gives the power to interpret the law
only to judges. U.S. CONST. ART. III. Since judges at one time exclusively held
the ability to resolve disputes, a judicial monopoly existed. A monopoly is a
privilege vested in one or more persons consisting in the exclusive right or
power to carry on a particular business. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1007 (6th
ed. 1990).
9. ADR consists of procedures, other than standard litigation, used to
settle disputes. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 78 (6th ed. 1990). ADR includes
many different methods for settling disputes. EDWARD J. COSTELLO, JR.,
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suits, courts have become overburdened,"0 forcing the courts either
to create or submit to new procedures and methods for resolving
disputes." In search of ways to alleviate this overburden, legislatures, governmental agencies, and courts have promoted and utilM
ized various forms of ADR.
Although many different forms of ADR are now in use, contracting parties use arbitration more often than any other form. 8
Unlike other forms of dispute resolution, arbitration avoids the
formalities, delays, and expenses of traditional litigation, while
maintaining the trial like adversarial forum."' Through binding
arbitration, arbitrators now resolve issues that would otherwise be

CONTROLLING CONFLICT 21 (1996). All alternative methods to litigation are
included within the scope of ADR. Id. A non-inclusive list consists of arbitration, mediation, conciliation, negotiation, fact finding and mini-trials. Id. at
105. Arbitration is a process in which a neutral third party renders a binding
decision that is binding after a hearing. Id. Mediation is a "private, informal... process" used to resolve disputes by the skills of a neutral third party
called a mediator. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 981 (6th ed. 1990). A mediator
does not have "power to impose a decision .... " Id. Conciliation allows parties to settle disputes in an "unantagonistic manner." It is used before trial or
arbitration. Id. at 289. Negotiation is a resolution "process of submission and
consideration of offers until" the parties reach an agreement. Id. at 1036. In
fact finding, a board "or committee appointed by [either] business [or] government ... investigate[s] and report[s the] facts" of a given situation in order
to help the parties reach a settlement. Id. at 592. A mini-trial is "a private,
voluntary, informal.. . process] in which attorneys for each [party] make a
brief presentation of their best case before [an official having] authority to
settle." Id. at 997.
10. Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or nathema, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986). For example, in 1985 parties disputing
construction contracts filed 3,735 cases involving claims totaling $646 million
to arbitration. MICHAEL F. HOELLERING, AAA, ARB. AND LAw 37-38 (1985).
At the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), an explosion in
the number of claims filed with that agency in 1995 led to a backlog of 88,000
cases. Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Claims: A
PracticalGuide to Designing and Implementing Enforceable Agreements, 47
BAYLOR L. REV. 591, 593 n.9 (1995).
11. See supra note 9 and accompanying text for an explanation of different
methods for resolving disputes.
12. Arthur S. Hayes & Ann Hagedorn, Legal Beat, Arbitration in Commercial Cases Found to Save Money, Not Time, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 1990, at B10.
Many view arbitration as the solution to problems associated with the civil
justice system. Id.
13. See Joseph T. Mclaughlin, Arbitrability:Current Trends in the United
States, 59 ALB. L. REV. 905, 915-16 (1996) (stating that the arbitrability of
claims in the areas of employment law, consumer rights, family law, torts,
antitrust, bankruptcy law, and intellectual property has enlarged due to the
disappearance of "public policy" exceptions).
14. IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAw 7 (1992); Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1974) (stating that the informality of
arbitration allows it to be an "efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious" form of
dispute resolution).
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decided by federal or state judges.' An arbitrator or group of arbitrators assume the functions which judges traditionally have performed.18
Through compulsory arbitration clauses in employment contracts, arbitrators resolve statutory disputes which arise out of the
employment relationship." In order to resolve employment disputes, arbitrators must interpret the meaning and application of
federal statutes. In such cases, an employee's statutory rights
protecting himself or herself from discrimination based on age,'
gender,' race," and physical capabilities' can be defined and adjudicated by an arbitrator without any court supervision.'
Moreover, the Supreme Court has yet to decide whether an
arbitrator's interpretation of an employee's statutory rights can
evade judicial review, even though the arbitrator decides questions
of law." The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) grants courts limited
authority to review arbitral awards.' Traditionally, the Supreme
15. LEONARD L. RSiUN &JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND
LAWYERS 251 (1987). See John P. McIver & Susan Keilitz, Court Annexed
Arbitration:An Introduction, 14 JUST. SYS. J. 123 (1991) (stating that many
states have non-binding mandatory arbitration policies which allow arbitrators to decide cases in place of a trial judge).
16. See Sharona Hoffman, Mandatory Arbitration: Alternative Dispute
Resolution or Coercive Dispute Suppression?, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
131, 134 (1996) (stating an arbitrator's interpretation of the law, normally the
role of a judge, withstands court scrutiny unless the award shows a manifest
disregard for the law). See also Martin H. Malin, ArbitratingStatutory Employment Claims in the Aftermath of Gilmer, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 77, 101
(1996) (pointing out that an arbitrator erroneously interpreting Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act may not ever be corrected by a higher authority).
17. See Mclaughlin, supra note 13, at 915 (stating that the arbitrability of
claims has risen due to the disappearance of "public policy" exceptions).
18. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991)
(deciding whether a mandatory arbitration clause applied to a claim under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)).
19. See ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1985) (prohibiting employers from discriminating on the basis of age).
20. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (prohibiting employers from discriminating on the basis of gender or of race).
21. Id.
22 See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104
Stat. 328 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C.,
and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter ADA] (prohibiting discrimination against disabled
persons).
23. See Hoffman, supra note 16, at 134.
24. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23 (1991) (enforcing an arbitration clause
where an employee raised an ADEA claim).
25. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994) [hereinafter FAA]. Section 10 of the FAA provides in part that a United States court can vacate an
arbitral award:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means.
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Court has interpreted this authority to encompass only procedural
errors." Thus, an arbitrator may erroneously interpret the substantive law and his or her decision will stand uncorrected." The
losing party will then suffer hardships from the uncorrected errors.u Hardships for employers and employees may also stem from

the disadvantaged positions arbitration places on the parties, or
from defects in the bargain for the employment contract. Since
arbitrators make decisions that judges would usually make," an
arbitrator's decision should be subject to adequate judicial review.
For adequate judicial review to exist, courts will have to expand
their authority to review an arbitrator's decisions on questions of
law.
In the context of employment contract disputes, courts should
expand their authority to adequately review arbitration awards.
Currently, courts have set the standard for review of arbitral
awards too high by merely vacating, modifying, or correcting
awards when they display either "a manifest disregard for the
law," or a violation of section 10 of the FAA. These standards of
review give courts too little power to correct an arbitrator's errone(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators,
or either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made.
(5) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the award to be made has not expired the court may, in
its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
Id.
26. See Michael A. Scodro, Arbitrating Novel Legal Questions: A Recommendation for Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1927, 1937-38 (1996) (arguing that
courts should correct substantive errors, aside from just procedural errors

that arbitrators cause).

27. Main, supra note 16, at 101-02. A United States District Court is considerably restrained in vacating an arbitrator's award. See supra note 25 and
accompanying text stating the current method to vacate arbitral awards. The
same is true concerning the modification or correction of an arbitrator's
award. See FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1994) (listing only three procedural reasons for
which a court may modify an arbitral award).
28. See, e.g., Main, supra note 16, at 101-02 (suggesting that an error by
an arbitrator in interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act can unjustly give
an employer a competitive advantage which is not subject to correction
through judicial review).
29. See Hoffman, supra note 16, at 134.
30. See Scodro, supra note 26, at 1937-38 (explaining the bases upon which
courts have reviewed arbitral awards); FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994). See also
Hoffman, supra note 16, at 134 (arguing that unless the arbitral award demonstrates a manifest disregard for the law, an arbitrator's error of law is not
ordinarily vacated).
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ous interpretations of law, which has traditionally been a duty of
the judiciary.
Part I of this Comment discusses the historical use of arbitration in American law, and the enactment of a national comprehensive arbitration act. Part II examines early United States Supreme Court decisions concerning the validity of compulsory
arbitration clauses. Part III then analyzes the Supreme Court's
decision to allow compulsory arbitration of statutory employment
claims. Part IV discusses the disadvantages to employers and
employees and the defects in the law when courts enforce compulsory arbitration clauses in employment contracts. Finally, Part V
proposes that if courts decide to enforce such clauses, the courts
should allow discretionary judicial review to correct errors from
binding arbitration.
I.

THE EMERGENCE OF ARBITRATION AS ONE FORM OF ADR

A. Arbitrationin Early American Law
Like most American law, American arbitration law finds its
origins in the English common law.81 Arbitration was first used in
the United States to settle disputes between employers and employees.' The origins of modern employment arbitration in the
United States stem from the use of alternative forms of dispute
resolution in New England and New York during the mid-1600s.3
The colonial courts arranged for the arbitration of disputes concerning wage rates and quality of work." As arbitration practice
continued in the United States, the courts or the litigating parties
typically selected "good men " ' as arbitrators."
31. Barry C. Silverman, Comment, Voluntary Commercial Arbitration:
Carefully Constructed Contract Clauses Can Cure Countless Conflicts, 25 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 309, 313 n.15 (1992) (citing Kulukundis Shipping Co. v.
Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982-84 (2d Cir. 1942)).
32. Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, American Labor Arbitration: the
Early Years, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 373, 375 (1983). Recently, neutral third parties have adjudicated disputes through voluntary arbitration. Id. Arbitration
has its recorded use in ancient times with King Solomon and Philip II of Macedon. FRANK ELKoURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 2
(4th ed. 1985). President George Washington also used arbitration to settle
labor disputes. Id.
33. Nolan & Abrams, supra note 32, at 377.
34 Id.

35. Id. On at least one reported occasion, the "good men" appointed were

actually women. Id. at n.14.
36. Id. For example, in Massachusetts during the 1700s, judicial labor arbitration was used:
At a church meeting at Wareham on Buzzard's Bay, held in 1761, a
complaint was lodged by Benjamin Norris against Benjamin Fearing, in
which Norris contended that both parties had agreed to submit a dispute regarding compensation for a fishing voyage to the Reverend Rug-
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The development of commercial and financial industries at
the beginning of the twentieth century contributed to the growth
of arbitration. 7 The utilization of arbitration in commercial and
financial industries such as railroads," coal mines," newspapers,40
and clothing 1 led to a nationwide acceptance of arbitration as a
legitimate form of dispute resolution.' The federal government,
with the approval of emerging industries, began to enact laws that
not only sanctioned arbitration, but positively encouraged it.' In
1920, New York led the reform in arbitration law by enacting the
first comprehensive statute enforcing pre-dispute arbitration
agreements." Arbitration became a profession rather than an avocation. ' A national arbitration act was the next step."

gles of Rochester and to "stand by his judgement." Fearing later reneged, refusing to settle unless a court judgment were procured against

him. Accordingly he was suspended by the church meeting "till he
should give Christian Satisfaction."
RICHARD B. MORRIS, GovERNmENT AND LABOR IN EARLY AMERICA 210 (1965).

37. MACNEIL, supra note 14, at 15. During the early 1900s, the commercial
and financial industries of Chicago and New York developed sophisticated and
intricate arbitration agreements which were replaced by modern arbitration
statutes. Id.
3& See generally The Arbitration Act of 1888 Ch. 1063, 25 Stat. 501 (1888)
(repealed 1898); The Erdman Act of 1898 Ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424 (1898)
(repealed 1913); The Newlands Act of 1913 ch. 6, 38 Stat. 103 (1913) (repealed
1926); The Transportation Act of 1920 ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456 (1920) (amended
1926); The Railway Labor Act of 1926 ch. 347, 44 STAT. 77 (1926) amended
1934) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1976)).
39. See generally Larry W. Blalock, The CurrentState of GrievanceArbitration in the Coal Industry, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 1401 (1980) (discussing the development of arbitration in the coal mining industry).
40. See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 32, at 390 & n.94 (discussing the history of the newspaper industry and the International Typographical Union).
41 See JESSE T. CARPENTER, COMPETITION AND COLLECTIvE BARGAINING
IN THE NEEDLE TRADES 55-89 (1972) (discussing labor relations and collective

bargaining in the clothing industry).
42. Nolan & Abrams, supra note 32, at 382.
43. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
different industries that have used arbitration in employment disputes.
44. Arbitration, 1920 N.Y. Laws, ch. 275 (codified as amended at N.Y.
C.P.L.R. §§ 7501-14 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1995)). For the first time, the
New York Act made written contracts to settle future disputes through arbitration valid, enforceable, and irrevocable. MACNEIL, supra note 14, at 35.
See generally Note, Erie, Bernhardt, and Section 2 of the United States ArbitrationAct: A Farragoof Rights, Remedies, and a Right to Remedy, 69 YALE

L.J. 847 (1960) (describing the legislative history of the 1920 N.Y. Act). Dur-

ing the same time period, the United States was restructuring its workforce to
adjust to the end of World War I. Nolan & Abrams, supra note 32, at 401-07
(discussing the impact of the first World War on industries and their use of
arbitration through groups such as the National War Labor Board (NWLB)).
45. Nolan & Abrams, supra note 32, at'408.
46. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924); S. REP. No. 68-536, at 2 (1924).
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B. A National ComprehensiveArbitrationAct
In 1920, the American Bar Association (ABA) directed its
Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law to report
and draft a bill for Congress on commercial arbitration.' After few
amendments and no opposition, the House' and the Senate'
unanimously passed the bill. The result was the United States
Arbitration Act." In 1947, Congress re-enacted and codified the
United States Arbitration Act to create the FAA.5'
Prior to the enactment of a national comprehensive arbitration act, courts generally declared agreements to arbitrate future
disputes unenforceable and revocable.'
The FAA changed this
policy.' The intention of the FAA was to provide a means to resolve disagreements arising under commercial contracts containing clauses to settle future disputes." Courts can now enforce an
arbitration clause like any other clause in a contract.5
The FAA covers all arbitration agreements in "contract[s] evidencing... transaction[s] involving commerce."M However, nothing in the FAA applies "to contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any class of workers engaged in foreign or

47. MACNEIL, supra note 14, at 85-88. The committee drafted a Uniform
State Act on Arbitration and a tentative draft of a federal act, Arbitration of
Disputes in Admiralty and Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Id. The ABA
approved the Uniform State Act and its referral to the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Id. After about four years of proposals and revisions, the ABA presented a national arbitration bill before the
United States Congress. See generally id. 83-91 (discussing the ABA's work in
creating, developing, lobbying, amending, and persuading the passage of the
United States Arbitration Act (USAA)).
48. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1.
49. S. REP. No. 68-536, at 1.
50. Ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16
(1994)).
51. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
52. MACNEIL, supra note 14, at 84-85.
53. See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
54. MACNEIL, supra note 14, at 100-01 n.31 (citing 65 CONG. REc. H111080
(1924)). Prof. Macneil cites the House Congressional Record where Congressman Miller explains the purpose of the bill before the House floor debate.

Id.
55. Id.
56. 9 U.S.C. § 2. Section 2 of the FAA states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in
writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of
such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
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interstate commerce. 7 The FAA provides for stays of proceedings
in the federal district courts where the suit is pending arbitration.' When one party fails, neglects, or refuses to comply with an
arbitration agreement, the FAA provides for orders compelling
arbitration." Moreover, the FAA "establishes that, as a matter of
federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at
hand is the construction of the contract itself or an allegation of
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability."60
The FAA has undergone few changes since its codification in
1947." Because of the FAA's support, a trend of promoting arbitration by private businesses, as well as by federal and state governments, has emerged. Every state has enacted a statute governing the use of arbitration agreements.'
More businesses are
utilizing employment contracts with mandatory arbitration
clauses.' These clauses require employees to settle all their disputes through binding arbitration." Since arbitration clauses were
beginning to have a greater impact on society, the United States
Supreme Court began granting certiorari in cases raising arbitra57. Id. at § 1. Section 1 of the FAA states in part:
[C]ommerce, as herein defined, means commerce among the several
States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States
or in the district of Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or
between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign
nation, but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.
Id. A debate sparked by the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer exists over
the issue of whether all employment contracts are governed by the FAA. See
generally Main, supra note 16; Hoffman, supra note 16; Bales, supra note 10.
58. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).
59. Id. at § 4.
60. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983).
6L See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. The FAA continues to regulate arbitration
agreements in contracts which are subject to federal jurisdiction as confirmed
by the United Supreme Court. See also Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284
U.S. 263, 279 (1932) (upholding the constitutionality of the FAA). Congress
amended the FAA in 1988 to include section 15 stating the inapplicability of
the Act of State doctrine and section 16 governing appeals. 9 U.S.C. §§ 15-16.
62. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1280 (Deering 1981 & Supp. 1993);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.01 (West 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5001
(West 1992); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7501 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1993); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2711.01 (Anderson 1912 & Supp. 1992).
63. Furchgott, supra note 1, at 1. According to the results of a 1995 poll,
30% of United States companies with 20 or more employees planned to increase their use of employment contracts. Id. By using employment contracts,
employers can insulate themselves from an employee's discrimination suit
through the use of compulsory arbitration clauses. Id
64 Id.
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tion issues.
I.

EARLY SUPREME COURT DECISIONS CONCERNING COMPULSORY
ARBITRATION CLAUSES

Along with a strong federal policy favoring arbitration, decisions by the United States Supreme Court have promoted the use
of arbitration agreements.'
Although the Supreme Court has
clearly stated that arbitration agreements pursuant to the FAA
are constitutional,' the Court has questioned the use of broad
agreements to arbitrate future disputes. 1 The next two sections
discuss early Supreme Court decisions analyzing whether broad
arbitration agreements are against public policy.
A The Public Policy Defense
Not until twenty-seven years after Congress created the FAA
did the Supreme Court begin to analyze the validity of broad arbitration agreements involving statutory rights.' In Wilko v. Swan,
the Court had to decide whether a party could waive their right to
judicial remedies provided by the Securities Act of 1933 through
written agreements to arbitrate future disputes." Wilko brought
suit against a brokerage firm claiming misrepresentation and
omission of information under the Securities Act.7 However, an
65. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991)
(stating that a claim under the ADEA was subjected to compulsory arbitration
pursuant to an arbitration agreement in a securities registration application);
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485-86
(1989) (upholding pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate claims under the Securities Act); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 223
(1987) (holding that the Securities Exchange Act and RICO claims were arbitrable under pre-dispute arbitration agreements); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 617 (1985) (subjecting antitrust

disputes to arbitration under the FAA); Moses, 460 U.S. at 24 (stating that
any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration).
66. See, e.g., Marine Transit Corp., 284 U.S. at 279 (upholding the use of
the FAA in federal courts, but not in state courts).
67. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 617; McMahon, 482
U.S. at 223; Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 429-30 (1953), overruled by
Rodriguez, 490 U.S. 427.
68. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438 (1953) (holding that broad arbitration
agreements were not enforceable).
69. Id. at 430. Wilko was a securities buyer who entered into an agreement with a brokerage firm to buy 1,600 shares of a company's common stock.
Id. at 428-29. Through a merger contract with a larger company, the stock
was to be worth more, enticing financial interest to buy the stocks. Id. After
the firm allegedly mishandled Wilko's stocks, Wilko sold the stocks for a loss.
Id. at 429.
70. Id. at 428. The Securities Act of 1933 allowed a person who received
untrue statements of material facts or did not receive material facts to sue
either at law or in equity in any court having jurisdiction. 15 U.S.C. § 8-9
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agreement between the two parties contained a clause requiring
the parties to settle all future controversies through arbitration.7 1
This clause conflicted with a provision in the Securities Act which
stated that any person claiming a violation could sue in federal
court.U

The Court balanced Congress' intent in passing the Securities
Act with the purpose behind the FAA's enactment. In so doing,
the Court reasoned that when a securities buyer agrees to waive
the right to sue in court before any controversy or dispute occurs,
the buyer gives up more than would a party contracting in other
business transactions."' The Court stated that at the time the
buyer negotiated the contract, the buyer surrendered an advantage that the Securities Act provided.7 5 At that time, the buyer
was less able to judge the magnitude of the advantage.7 6 By waiving the right to a judicial remedy for a remedy through arbitration,
the Court noted that an arbitrator makes an award for one party
without having to explain the reasons for the award. An award
then may prevail without judicial review for errors, causing public
policy to be undermined. 8
(1997).
7L Wilko, 346 U.S. at 429-30.
72. See Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263, 279 (1932) (applying
the FAA in federal courts).
73. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 430 (1953). Congress' intent behind the
Securities Act was to protect investors from fraud. Id. Whereas, the FAA was
passed to give arbitration agreements the same status as other contract provisions and to avoid the delay and cost of litigation. Id. at 431-32. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (2) (1994); FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
74 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435.
75. Id.
76. Id. The Securities Act creates a special right for buyers to recover in
court for misrepresentations. Id. at 431. When a buyer is held to arbitrate all
future disputes, an arbitrator then must determine whether a violation of the
statute exists, and apply the statute without any judicial instruction on the
law. Id. at 433-34. Nothing in Wilko's arbitration agreement requires the arbitrators to make an award according to the established law. Id. Wilko seems
to suggest that the parties could have contracted to require their arbitrator to
follow a certain set of laws, state or federal. Id.
77. Id. at 436. Many articles now suggest that the parties contracting to
arbitrate should create a provision requiring the arbitrators to write opinions
explaining their awards. See Developments in the Law . Employment Dis.
crimination, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1670, 1690-91 (1996) (suggesting arbitrators
explain their decisions in written opinions); Michele L. Giovagnoli, To Be or
Not to Be?: Recent Resistance to Mandatory Arbitration Agreements in the
Employment Arena, 64 UMKC L. REv. 547, 578 (1996) (discussing contracting
parties' agreement to have arbitrator explain his or her decision); Bales, supra
note 10, at 610 (stating that arbitrators should give written explanations regarding their awards).
78. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438. When arbitration agreements try to settle
statutory disputes, courts must reconcile the conflicting policies behind the
statute and the FAA. Id. Invalidating the arbitration agreement helps to
implement the Securities Act's intention to protect buyers from fraud. Id, The
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The Wilko decision created the "public policy defense" against
the enforcement of arbitration agreements under the FAA concerning statutory claims." The "public policy defense" relied on three
principles: "(1) a judicial forum was superior to arbitration for enforcing statutory rights; (2) compulsory arbitration constituted a
waiver of one's statutory right to a judicial forum in contravention
of public policy; and (3) the informality of arbitration made it difficult for courts to correct errors in statutory interpretation." 80
These three principles eventually faded through the Mitsubishi
Trilogy.
B. The Mitsubishi Trilogy

In three Supreme Court decisions, commonly known as the
Mitsubishi Trilogy,81 the Court struck down each of the "public
policy defenses" to further the federal policy favoring arbitration.'
According to Wilko, although there was a federal policy favoring
arbitration, the federal policy protecting against a statutory violation was controlling.' However, Wilko also foresaw a time when
courts would allow arbitration in controversies based on statutory
violations." Through the Mitsubishi Trilogy, the Court decided
that the time had come for arbitration in statutory disputes.
1. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,Inc.
In 1985, the Supreme Court addressed which claims are subject to arbitration under the Sherman Act in Mitsubishi Motors

Court in Wilko held that Congress' intent in enacting the Securities Act is better served by invalidating the agreement to arbitrate under the FAA. Id.
Therefore, a buyer could not waive a Securities Act claim through a compulsory arbitration agreement. Id.
79. Richard A. Bales, A New Directionfor American Labor Law: Individual
Autonomy and the Compulsory Arbitrationof Individual Employment Rights,
30 Hous. L. REv. 1863, 1881 (1994).
80. Id.; cf Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 631 (1985) (deciding that statutory claims should go to arbitration
according to the parties intentions because arbitration is not inferior to the
courts).
81 See Robert J. Lewton, Comment, Are Mandatory, Binding Arbitration
Requirements Viable Solutions for Employers Seeking to Avoid Litigating
Statutory Employment Discrimination Claims?, 59 ALB. L. REV. 991, 1006
(1996)(stating that Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
Rodriguez de QuUas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., and Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon are commonly known as the Mitsubishi trilogy).
82. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 614; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 220; Rodriguez, 490
U.S. at 477.
83. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953). Wilko allowed a federal court
to adjudicate statutory causes of action even though a compulsory arbitration
agreement existed. Id. at 433-34.
84. Id. at 431-32.
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Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. " For the first time, the Supreme Court decided that the FAA did not restrict arbitration of
statutory claims.m The Court concluded that judicial suspicion
concerning the desirability and competence of arbitral forums inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative form of
dispute resolution." But, since a liberal federal policy favored the
enforcement of arbitration agreements, any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.' The Court could find no reason to depart from that policy
when a party raises statutory claims."
Although the Court allowed some statutory claims to be arbitrated, the Court did not decide that all controversies implicating
statutory rights are suitable for arbitration.'m "By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive
rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in

85. 473 U.S. at 638. In that case, the court held that parties can arbitrate
antitrust disputes under the FAA. Id. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. (Soler), a
dealership, entered into a Distributor Agreement with Chrysler International,
S.A. (CISA) to distribute Mitsubishi vehicles. Id. at 617. That same day,
Soler, CISA, and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. (Mitsubishi) signed a Sales Procedure Agreement which referred to the Distributor Agreement. Id. Mitsubishi
sold vehicles to Soler with additional conditions and terms for resale. Id. The
Sales Agreement contained an arbitration clause requiring all controversies
between parties to be settled by arbitration. Id. Under the contract, all disputes were to be settled by arbitration in Japan according to the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association rules. Id. Soler argued to no avail that the
Japanese rules and regulations could not rule on a United States federal statute. Id. at 623. However, if the Japanese arbitrators did not decide the issue
concerning the federal statute, a party can reinitiate suit in federal court. Id.
at 637. The controversy in this case developed when the new-car market began to slack. Id. at 617. Soler requested that Mitsubishi delay or cancel
shipment of several orders. Id Mitsubishi denied the request and Soler defaulted on payments. Id. at 617-18.
86. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
625 (1985).
87. Id. at 626-27.
88. Id. at 625 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
89. Id. See generally Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20

(1991) (discussing ADEA claims); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (analyzing Securities Act claims); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (examining Securities Exchange Act and RICO claims); Moses, 460 U.S. 1 (discussing antitrust claims).
90. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627. Congress may expressly prohibit arbitra-

tion use for certain statutory rights. See generally Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S.

427 (1953) (holding that a special right in the Securities Act gave securities
buyers access to federal courts even with an arbitration agreement). A court
must look to the Congressional intent behind the statute in question to decide
whether rights under the statute are suitable for arbitration. Mitsubishi, 473
U.S. at 627.
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an arbitral, rather than a judicial forum." Therefore, unless Congress intended to preclude a person from waiving judicial remedies
to statutory rights, courts were to force parties, who bargained for
the arbitration clauses, to arbitrate their disputes." However, in
only two years, the Court narrowed this rule to allow claims to be
arbitrated even though Congress enacted a statute that preserved
a person's judicial remedies.
2. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon
Shortly after Mitsubishi,the Court heard Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon." Shearson decided that the arbitration
of statutory claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act and
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) can
proceed according to a compulsory pre-dispute arbitration agreement." The Court stated that Congress created the FAA to reverse judicial hostility towards agreements to arbitrate.' The enforcement of arbitration agreements is not set aside when a
person, bound by an agreement, raises a statutory rights claim."
The Court reiterated that the time has past when the desirability
and competence of arbitration is questioned.'
91 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
92. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985). A defect in the bargaining process will render the contract or part
of the contract unenforceable. MICHAEL L. CLOSEN ET AL., CONTRACTS 255

(1992). Courts must apply a two-step process to determine whether congress
precluded a waiver of judicial remedies: "[Flirst determin[e] whether the parties' agreement to arbitrate reached the statutory issues, and then, upon
finding it did, consider[] whether legal constraints external to the parties'
agreement foreclosed the arbitration of those claims." Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at
628. The Court concluded that parties may agree, before any controversy materializes between them, whether to adjudicate their controversies in an arbi-

tral or judicial forum. Id.
93. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
94. Id. at 222. McMahon and his wife entered into an agreement with
Shearson/American Express, Inc. (Shearson), a brokerage firm, to trade securities. Id. at 222-23. The agreement contained a compulsory arbitration
clause requiring arbitration of all disputes arising between the two parties.
Id. at 223. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477, 478 (1989) (upholding an arbitration clause); Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at
617 (stating that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate claims under The Securities Exchange Act are valid). Having lost a substantial amount of money
from their business venture, the McMahons alleged that Shearson engaged in
fraudulently excessive trading with their accounts in violation of the Securities Exchange Act and RICO. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 223.
95. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 224. The Court strengthens the federal policy
favoring arbitration. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
96. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226.
97. Id. The FAA allows the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims when the statutes do not state otherwise. Id. Congress must have
intended to preclude a party's waiver ofjudicial remedies. Id. at 227.
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Although the Wilko Court's general suspicion regarding arbitration was valid at one time, the Court found that suspicion does
not hold true for today's arbitration procedures.m The Court narrowed Wilko to the point of almost making it ineffectual by limiting the decision to arbitration of statutory rights under the Securities Act." Since the plaintiffs in McMahon made the bargain to
arbitrate, they were held to that bargain." The Court concluded
that the potential complexities arising from that bargain should
not invalidate the agreement to arbitrate."°'
3. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.
The last case of the Mitsubishi Trilogy is Rodriguez de Quijas
v. Shearson/American Express, Inc." The Supreme Court decided
that securities claims under the Securities Act were subject to a
compulsory arbitration agreement."* A contracting party could
waive their right to judicial remedies concerning their securities
claims." The United States Supreme Court expressly overruled
Wilko, stating that arbitration does not inherently undermine any
of the substantive rights of the Securities Act." The Court held
that the prevailing view is to endorse federal statutes favoring arbitration as a method for resolving disputes.'
9& Id. at 226. When Wilko was decided, the Securities and Exchange
Commission's (SEC) general authority did not include any authority over arbitration rules of self-regulatory organizations. Id. at 233.
99. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232-33
(1987). The Court interpreted Wilko to say that a party's waiver of a judicial
forum was unenforceable because arbitration was inadequate to enforce statutory rights under section 12 of the Securities Act. Id. Wilko stated the Securities Act gave a party a special right to seek a judicial remedy. Wilko v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953). Wilko should be understood as barring
waiver of a judicial forum only where arbitration is inadequate to protect the
substantive rights at issue. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 228-29.
100. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 242.
10L Id. at 239.
102. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
103. Id. at 478.
104. Id. Rodriguez invested about $400,000 in securities with Shearson. Id.
The parties signed a standard customer agreement that contained a predispute arbitration agreement. Id. After losing his investments, Rodriguez
sued Shearson alleging violations under the Securities Act and the Securities
Exchange Act for unauthorized and fraudulent transactions. Id. at 478-79. A
federal district court allowed the claims under the Securities Exchange Act to
go to arbitration, but not the Securities Act claims. Id. The Court in Wilko
stated that Congress intended the Securities Act to create a special right
which invalidated arbitration of issues arising under the Act. Wilko, 346 U.S.
at 438. The district court stated that under Wilko, a court must decide claims
arising under the Securities Act. Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 479.
105. Id. at 485. Wilko, as decided by the Rodriguez Court, was incorrectly
decided because it did not follow the federal policy promoting arbitration. Id.
at 484.
106. Moses, 460 U.S. at 24. Arbitration agreements give securities buyers a
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By overruling Wilko, the Court affected almost a half-century
of decisions that followed a policy favoring judicial rather than arbitral resolution of statutory disputes.1" Supreme Court decisions
subsequent to Wilko have essentially struck down all the principles behind the "public policy defense"."
The Supreme Court
adopted a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration. The Court's
new jurisprudence opened the door for the adjudication of all federal statutes under compulsory arbitration agreements.
III. COMPULSORY ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY EMPLOYMENT
CLAIMS
Prior to 1991, the courts exclusively held the power to interpret the meaning of any and all disputed employment statutes.
However in 1991, the Supreme Court decided Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.'
The case addressed the issue of
whether a claim brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) is subject to compulsory arbitration." Having decided Rodriguez only two years previously, the
broader right to select a forum for resolving disputes. Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at

483. However, if the agreements were created through fraud or overwhelming
economic power, a court may invalidate the agreement. Mitsubishi Motors

Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985). The Supreme Court's past characterization of arbitration in Wilko reflects the old
judicial hostility towards arbitration which view has eroded over the years.

Id. Prior Supreme Court's decisions intensified the erosion. Id. (citing Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), Mitsubishi Mo-

tors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), Dean Witter
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985), Moses, 460 U.S. 1 (1983)).
107. Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 483. In Wilko, the Supreme Court recognized

the trend of promoting arbitration, but still required certain statutory rights
to be only resolved by the judiciary. Wilko, 348 U.S. at 438. However, since
the Court overruled Wilko in Rodriguez, the Court has allowed the interpretation that no statutory rights are only to be resolved by the judiciary unless
Congress says.
108. Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 484
(1989)(citing Wilko, 346 U.S. at 439 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). A judicial
forum is no longer considered superior to arbitration for enforcing statutory
rights. See Mitsubishi,473 U.S. at 636. Compulsory arbitration can constitute
a waiver of one's statutory right to a judicial forum. Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at
483; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226-27. Courts have limited access to review an
arbitral award which is sufficient. Id. at 232.
109. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
110. Id, at 23. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. (Interstate) hired Gilmer as a
Manager of Financial Services. Id. As a condition of employment, Gilmer
registered as a securities representative with several stock exchanges by
completing a required application. Id. Through the registration application
as mandated by the stock exchanges, Gilmer signed an agreement to arbitrate
any controversy arising out of his employment as a registered representative
or termination of employment. Id. The arbitration agreement was not contained in the employment contract between Gilmer and Interstate, but was
part of the registration application with the stock exchanges. Id. The Court
clearly stated that the issue in Gilmer did not concern arbitration under an
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Court had to determine the scope of an arbitrator's power to interpret any and all disputed employment statutes. 1 ' There were two
ways the Court could have decided this issue. The Court could
have allowed arbitration of any statutory claim arising from a
compulsory arbitration agreement. Or, the Court could have limited its decision to ADEA claims as it previously did with Securities Act claims."
Gilmer evinces a culmination of the Supreme Court's prior
decisions concerning compulsory arbitration of statutory claims
pursuant to the FAA.118 The Court reasoned that the purpose of
the FAA is to put arbitration agreements on the same level as
other contract provisions. " " Contracting parties must bargain for
arbitration agreements without coercion.16 Without Congress
precluding a waiver of judicial remedies under the disputed statute, the Court required the parties to arbitrate their statutory disputes.1 6 The Court concluded that if the congressional intent is
employment contract. Id. at 25. For, if employment contracts were in ques-

tion, the FAA may not regulate arbitration clauses in employment contracts.
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Interstate fired Gilmer
when he was sixty-two years old. Id. at 23. Gilmer alleged that his termination was due to his age. Id. See the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
29 U.S.C. § 621 (1985). He filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and brought a suit in district court under the
ADEA. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23. Within a set time period after an alleged unlawful conduct occurs, an employment discrimination claim must fied with
the EEOC. Hoffman, supra note 16, at 138.
111. After overruling Wilko, the Court's decision in Rodriguez did not state
whether all statutory disputes subject to arbitration agreements would be resolved only through arbitration. See Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 483-84 (stating
statutory claims are subject to arbitration absent statutory language precluding a waiver of judicial remedies).
112. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27. The Supreme Court rejected each argument
raised by Gilmer. Id. First the Court decided that arbitration was not inconsistent with the statutory purposes behind the ADEA. Id. Second, the Court
found that an arbitral forum was not procedurally inadequate to protect an
employee's statutory employment rights. Id. at 29. Third, the Court held that
an arbitration agreement between an employer and employee was not an unenforceable adhesion contract. Id. at 32-33. Lastly, the Court concluded that
compulsory arbitration was not inadequate for the resolution of statutory
employment discrimination claims. Id. at 33.
113. See generally Rodriguez, 490 U.S. 477 (holding that a statutory claim
was subject to arbitration); McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (allowing compulsory arbitration under a pre-dispute agreement); Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614 (deciding
that the FAA governed the compulsory arbitration of a statutory dispute);
Moses H. Cone Meml Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) (stating
that a federal policy favoring arbitration exists).
114. MACNEIL, supra note 14, at 100-01 & n.31 (citing 65 CONG. REC.
H111080 (1924)). Prof. Macneil cites the House Congressional Record where
Congressman Miller explains the purpose of the bill before the House floor
debate. Id.
115. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
116. Id.
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resolve the substannot clear, arbitral forums should continue to
117
tive rights afforded by the disputed statute.
In promoting a policy favoring arbitration, the Court held that
all statutory claims are subject to compulsory arbitration agreements. 118 However, under section 1 of the FAA, arbitration agreements made under employment contracts could be excluded from
the FAA's coverage." Section 1 provides that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."' Since Gilmer did not decide the scope of the
FAA's exclusion provision, a broad interpretation of the 1925 provision could exclude all employment contracts of workers engaged
in interstate commerce from the FAAs coverage.2'
Currently, courts are bound by the FAA to interpret contractual arbitration agreements as presumptively valid, irrevocable,
If courts exclude employment contracts from
and enforceable.'
the FAA's coverage, the courts are then free to adjudicate the employment arbitration agreements on a case by case basis without
the judicial review restrictions of the FAA.' If courts do not interpret the FAA to bar employment contracts, they should alternatively expand judicial review concerning arbitral awards interpreting employment statutes.
But for compulsory arbitration agreements, the court system
would traditionally resolve all statutory employment disputes. Although the Supreme Court has stated that a limited judicial review of arbitral awards is adequate,' the Court has not decided
this issue as it pertains to employment contracts. Pre-dispute arbitration agreements threaten employees with termination for not
prospectively giving up their right to judicial remedies. In conjunction with promoting a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration, courts should encourage a discretionary judicial review of
arbitral awards to correct errors arising exclusively from employment contract disputes.

117. Id. See Moses, 460 U.S. at 24.
11& Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29. Unless Congress explicitly precludes arbitration of a statutory claim, statutory rights can be subject to arbitration. Id.
119. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). In a dissenting opinion in Gilmer, Justice Stevens
argues that all arbitration clauses in employment contracts are exempt from
the FAA's coverage. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
12L See William F. Kolakowski III, Note, The FederalArbitrationAct and
IndividualEmployment Contracts:A Better Means to an Equally JustEnd, 93
MICH. L. REV. 2171, 2173 (1995) (discussing the differences between a broad
and narrow interpretation of the FAA's exclusion provision).
122. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
123. Hoffman, supra note 16, at 148.
124. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32 n.4 (citing Shearson/American Express Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987)).
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IV. COMPULSORY ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT

CONTRACTS

This Part examines why courts should allow discretionary
judicial review of arbitral awards from compulsory arbitration
agreements in employment contracts. Section A discusses the disadvantages to employers and employees caused by compulsory arbitration. Section B sets forth two defects, duress and unconscionability, in the bargaining process between the employer and
employee which could be minimized through adequate judicial review.
A

DisadvantagesTo Employers and Employees

Although past Supreme Court decisions favor a general arbitration policy, the Court has not specifically approved of compulsory arbitration agreements between employers and employees
under an employment contract.' Before the Court decides the issue, it should first recognize the disadvantages of advocating the
use of compulsory arbitration agreements in employment contracts. Indeed, several disadvantages exist for both the employer
and the employee.
From an employer's point of view, the avoidance of formalities, delays and expenses of ordinary litigation may encourage
employees to raise frivolous disputes against the employer.'"
Compulsory arbitration gives an employee easier access to a forum
for resolving disputes.'
An employer will then have to defend
against many more employee claims of which few may be important enough to invest the time or money.'
When hiring many
employees, an employer may be forced to spend more money to defend against employees' claims than it would absent any arbitration provision.
Pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements also disadvantage employees. Employees may believe that compulsory arbitration takes away their individual rights and reduces the amount of
money normally recoverable for an employer's discriminatory violations.m Employers may be giving their employees a reason to
unionize by forcing arbitration.' This would counteract the effi125. Developments in the Law - Employment Discrimination,supra note 85,
at 1676-77; Lewton, supra note 81, at 1019.

126. William M. Howard, Arbitrating Employment DiscriminationClaims:
Do You Really Have To? Do You Really Want To?, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 255, 289

(1994)(noting that arbitration provides a less costly forum in which low-paid
employees may raise claims that would otherwise require large retainers in a
court
127.
128.
129.
130.

of law).
Lewton, supra note 81, at 1029.
Id. at 1030; Giovagnoli, supra note 77, at 583.
Giovagnoli, supra note 77, at 584.
Michele M. Buse, Comment, ContractingEmployment Disputes Out of
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cient adjudication policy behind compulsory arbitration agreements since unionized employees are not required to accept
awards through compulsory arbitration.'' Also, employers can
force unwilling employees to sign pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements if a disparity in bargaining power exists between
an employer and employee because the employee may only have a
high school education or just some college education."
Disadvantages exist for both employers and employees because of a limited judicial review of an arbitrator's award.' Past
case law allows arbitrators to decide statutory disputes.'8' Arbitrators now resolve questions of law, traditionally the role of the judiciary, without any instruction from the courts." Under the current practice, many errors will stand uncorrected. In addition,
arbitrators are free to make awards without disclosing their reasoning.'" The use of arbitration agreements may adversely affect
the workplace relationship.
Courts can choose not to enforce compulsory arbitration
agreements in employment contracts because the Supreme Court
has not yet decided this issue.' The legal uncertainty surrounding this area of law could prove costly to employers and employees
by forcing more disputes. A court may interpret the FAA's exclusion provision broadly to exclude all employment contracts from
the FAA's coverage.' Also, a court can decide not to enforce compulsory arbitration agreements based on any plausible legal argument9 even though defects in the bargain for the contract may exist.1

B. Defects In The Bargain
When a future employee is threatened with losing a job for
not prospectively agreeing to arbitrate all claims against the employer, the bargaining process between the employer and employee
is defective, rendering the contract, or parts of the contract unenthe Jury System: An Analysis of the Implementation of Binding Arbitration in
the Non-Union Workplace and Proposals to Reduce the HarshEffects of a NonAppealable Award, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1485, 1511-12 (1995).
131. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 34 (1991); Buse,
supra note 130, at 1511-12.
132. Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 229-30 (3d Cir.
1997).
133. Bales, supra note 10, at 611-12.
134. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34 n.5; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626.
135. Malin, supra note 16, at 101.
136. Mai, supra note 16, at 101; Developments in the Law -- Employment
Discrimination,supra note 77, at 1690.
137. Developments in the Law -- Employment Discrimination,supra note
77, at 1676-1677; Lewton, supra note 81, at 1019.
13& Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139. See Lewton, supra note 81, at 1031-32 (discussing the fact that compulsory arbitration remains subject to any plausible legal argument).
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forceable."'
The existence of a bargained-for-exchange is the
principal basis which courts look to enforce contracts."" Although
a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration prevails, courts may
decide not to enforce compulsory arbitration agreements that are
not bargained for by the parties. When employees enter into an
employment contract, they must act freely without coercion. ' " If
coerced, the bargaining process is defective according to two theories of contract law: duress ' and unconscionability.'"
Duress is a condition where one party is induced by an improper threat of another to make a contract under circumstances
which deprive the former party the opportunity to exercise free
will." The law recognizes duress by economic coercion.' When
deciding if a contract is tainted by duress, a court looks to the time
the contract was formed to decide if a party was deprived of free
will in entering the agreement."7
Employers are using employment contracts that contain predispute arbitration clauses.4
Prospective employees are faced
with the choice of either signing the contracts containing such
clauses, or refusing to sign them and finding other employment. "
The threat of unemployment or inferior employment may induce
people to sign such contacts.' A prospective employee is coerced
into giving up a right to judicial remedies at a time when the employee is less able to judge the value of that right.'
The employee's understanding of the value of having the right to judicial
remedies can be impaired by the employee's need of a job and
money, or by the employee's lack of education. The right to judicial

140. A successful bargained-for-exchange requires that the contracting parties be free and competent in order to achieve their own self-interest. CLOSEN
ET. AL., supra note 92, at 255.

141 Id.
142. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CONTRACTS 349 (5th ed.
1995) (stating that a person coerced into conferring a benefit to another may
have a legal cause of action).

143. Id
144. Id. at 386.
145. CLOSEN ET. AL., supra note 92, at 272.
146. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 142, at 349.
147. CLOSEN ET. AL., supra note 92, at 272.
148. Furchgott, supra note 1, at 1.
149. Wade Lambert, Legal Beat, Employee Pacts to Arbitrate Sought by
Firms, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 1992, at B1. Such agreements send the message
that: "If you come here to work, you give up your right to enforce your public
right to be free of discrimination." Id,
150. See CLOSEN ET. AL., supra note 92, at 272 (stating that courts recognize
economic coercion or business compulsion as a threat leading to duress).
15L See Hoffman, supra note 16, at 154-55 (explaining that the considera-

tion given at the time of signing an agreement to resolve future disputes does
not match the benefits received because the need for the right to a judicial

remedy has not yet occurred).
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remedies aims to protect employees from coercion.1" Therefore, if
a court were to find duress, it would be based upon economic coercion." Under economic coercion, an employer threatens a prospective employee with economic hardship through loss of job for
not relinquishing a right to judicial remedies.'
Proponents of compulsory arbitration clauses argue that duress cannot exist when an employer and employee sign a contract
containing one of these clauses. "It is not duress to threaten to do
what there is a legal right to do. " '6' When an employer bargains
with a prospective employee, an employer may threaten any kind
of rightful act while bargaining. However, unlawful conduct can
lead to creating duress between contracting parties. 57
A wrongful threat can materialize to become unlawful conduct
creating duress.'
The fundamental issue in a duress case is
whether the employer's statement that induced the prospective
employee to sign the contract is the kind of statement the courts
should discourage by deeming it a wrongful threat. Although a
prospective employer may at times threaten an employee into
signing a contract without violating a law, an unjust and inequitable threat is wrongful.'
By requiring an employee to choose between signing an employment contract that prospectively waives a
right to a judicial remedy or finding a job elsewhere, the employee
is forced into an unjust and inequitable position. Before the prospective employee understands the magnitude of the right, he or
she is forced to waive it.
In addition to duress, unconscionability also creates a defect
in the employment bargaining process when contracting for a predispute compulsory arbitration clause.' A court has discretion to
apply the unconscionability doctrine to protect a weaker party
from being victimized by an overreaching stronger party.' Unconscionability can apply when one or more terms of a contract unreasonably put the weaker contracting party at a disadvantage,S
152. Hoffman, supra note 16, at 151 (citing Congressional committee reports
that show Congress intended to protect the access to a judicial forum).
15 See 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1617, at 704-05 (3d ed. 1970)
(stating that economic duress exists when the facts show that a breach will
result in an irreparable injury or harm).
1546 Id.
155. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 142, at 350.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. CLOSEN ET. AL., supra note 92, at 272.
159. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 142, at 370.
160. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1612 (6th ed. 1990).
161. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 142, at 386-87; CLOSEN ET. AL., supra note 100, at 315.
162. CLOSEN ET. AL., supra note 92, at 315.
163. Id. at 316. Professor Closen labels this type of unconscionability as
substantive unconscionability. Id.
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or when the court finds the stronger party's practices to preclude
the weaker party from making a meaningful bargaining choice.'"
. An employer usually occupies a stronger bargaining position
than a prospective employee." This is especially true where the
employee lacks latitude in the bargaining process.'" By requiring
an employee to waive access to the judiciary in order to gain employment, the employee forgoes a legal right.'" That right was
given to that employee by way of the U.S. Constitution or statute.
By possessing this legal right, the employee receives an advantage. " Therefore, when the employer requires the employee to
sign a compulsory pre-dispute arbitration agreement, the prospective employee is then at a disadvantage.
The counter argument is that a prospective employee should
be presumed to be on an even bargaining plain as the employer.'
When an employee enters a contract, the employee is held to what
was bargained. 7 ' After all, freedom to contract is a fundamental
concept of our legal system.'
However, the freedom to contract is thwarted when a contract
provision is designed to absolve one party from the consequences
of his own unlawful acts." Although arbitration can help to mend
an employer's discriminatory acts toward an employee, arbitrators
do not have the same guidance and oversight as judges. 7 Arbitrators may also show bias against employees.' Therefore, by requiring a compulsory pre-dispute arbitration agreement in employment contracts, an employer attempts to avoid the traditional
16t Id. Unconscionability under this theory is labeled procedural unconscionability. Id.
165. Margaret A. Jacobs, Legal Beat, Firms With PoliciesRequiringArbitration Are FacingObstacles, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1995, at B5.
166. See CLOSEN ET. AL., supra note 92, at 255 (explaining that during the
bargaining process parties exchange promises contingent on the advantage
each party is able to trade to the other).
167. Michael R. Holden, Note, Arbitration of State-Law Claims by Employees: An Argument for Containing FederalArbitration Law, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 1695, 1747 (1995). Employees have the right to go to court, rather than
being forced into compulsory arbitration, to resolve important statutory and
constitutional rights, including employment rights. Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974).
168. Hoffman, supra note 16, at 154.
169. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 142, at 398. Unconscionability occurs when a contract allows for an absence of meaningful choice on the part of
one party, along with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the
other party. Id.
170. Id. at 324; CLOSEN ET. AL., supra note 92, at 255.
171. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 142, at 389 (citing O'Callaghan v.
Waller & Beckwith Realty Co., 15 m.2d 436 (1958)).
172. CLOSEN ET. AL., supra note 92, at 315.
173. See Main, supra note 16, at 101 (recognizing that the public justice
system does not monitor arbitrators as it does judges).
174. Hoffman, supra note 16, at 138.
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judicial consequences of his wrongful acts. 7 '
When choosing between signing an arbitration -agreement or
losing a job, the prospective employee does not have a meaningful
choice.'
By having to choose between two alternatives, the prospective employee must submit to the employer's unreasonable
hiring practices.'" According to the doctrine of unconscionability a
defect exists in this bargained-for-exchange.
A federal policy favoring arbitration should continue in order
to encourage the use of arbitration. However, employment arbitration has become handicapped through the use of compulsory
arbitration agreements. These kinds of agreements allow for disadvantages and potential defects in the bargained-for-exchanged
between employers and employees. If a court can adequately review the arbitration process, employers and employees will be better served when using compulsory arbitration agreements in employment contracts.
V. EXPANDING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRAL AWARDS

In conjunction with promoting a liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration, courts should allow a discretionary judicial review of
arbitral awards. The courts currently have a limited ability to review an arbitral award.78 Only when an arbitrator evinces "a
manifest disregard for the law" or violates the FAA's section 10
may the court then correct errors created through the arbitration
process.'" Since the arbitrator's role has expanded, the courts'
ability to review the arbitrator's award should also expand. Specifically, the courts should be able to review arbitral awards of
statutory claims arising from compulsory arbitration agreements
in employment contracts.
Since the Supreme Court expanded the kinds of claims that
are subject to arbitration, the Court has given arbitrators a role in
resolving statutory employment disputes.'O As a result of this new
role, arbitrators may confront legal issues that the courts have not
175. Id.
176. See generally Hoffinan, supra note 16, at 154 (stating that compulsory

arbitration agreements induce inadequate consideration).
177. Compulsory arbitration agreements are illegally coercive when employees feel that they have to sign the agreement to keep or get a job. Lambert,
eupra note 158.

178. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994). See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 32 n.4 (1991) (recognizing that judicial scrutiny of an arbitration
award is limited).
179. See supra note 30 and accompanying text for an explanation of"a mani.
fest disregard for the law" standard. See also 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994) (regulating
the courts ability to vacate arbitral awards).
180. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.

614, 626 (1985) (stating that contracting parties to an arbitration agreement
can raise statutory rights claims).
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yet settled."8 Arbitrators can issue awards which are inconsistent
with the developed substantive law thereby greatly undermining
established precedent." Also, a court is deprived of the opportunity to develop precedent in an area where the law is inconsistent. n Arbitrators may not possess the resources to research the
current state of the law concerning a statute, and may therefore
incorrectly apply the statute.' Without the guidance of the judiciary, the parties are "at risk of being subject to different substantive law than a court would apply."' A court's adequate review of
arbitral awards will correct errors that are bound to occur by arbitrators in uncharted territory.'
The Supreme Court has recently characterized arbitral tribunals as capable of handling the legal complexities involved with
resolving employment statutory claims.' The assumption is that
arbitrators will follow judicial precedent defining the laws in
question." However, arbitrators may deviate from that precedent.
The extent of the deviation may vary according to the
source, form and status of the legal rule.l" Arbitrators will give
more consideration to law that is clearly defined as opposed to unsettled law based upon controversial views as to what the public
policy should be. 1 Although it is optimistic to assume that arbitrators will follow the law in deciding statutory employment
claims, what happens when an arbitrator substantially deviates
from the law but not to the point of a manifest disregard?
The case of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Bobker demonstrates the inefficiency in applying the manifest
disregard standard to arbitral awards of statutory claims."
Through a securities contract, Bobker, the plaintiff, ordered Mer-

181. Scodro, supra note 30, at 1943.
182. Id. An arbitrator's erroneous statutory interpretation may give a party
an improper advantage over the other contracting party. Malin, supra note
16, at 101.
183. Scodro, supra note 30, at 1943.
184. Id. at 1946. An arbitrator must give effect to the parties' bargain without invoking public laws that conflict, even though conflicting laws may exist.
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34.
185. Scodro, supra note 30, at 1946. See Malin, supra note 16, at 101.
186. See Main, supra note 16, at 102. Arbitrated public law issues should
be subject to de novo judicial review or else the issues will be resolved by nongovernmental bodies. Edwards, supra note 10, at 672. Since judges are subject to public scrutiny, their decisions are subject to a hierarchy of review.
Malin, supra note 16, at 100.
187. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33-35.
188. Scodro, supra note 30, at 1946.
189. Id.; Main, supra note 16, at 101.
190. ELKouRI & ELKOURI, supra note 32, at 368.
19L Id
192. 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1986).
19& Id.
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rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (Merrill Lynch) to sell all
4,000 shares of stock Bobker purchased.'TM Merrill Lynch tendered
the shares.' A few days later, Bobker then ordered Merrill Lynch
to "sell short" 2,000 shares of the same stock.' The dispute arose
after Merrill Lynch executed the sale and then reneged.' Bobker
compelled arbitration to recover the lost profits due to Merrill
Lynch's refusal to act.' Merrill Lynch argued that by selling short
2,000 shares they would have violated Rule 10b-4 of the SEC.'"
Without a written explanation for their decision, the arbitrators
awarded Bobker $12,500.' °
Merrill Lynch petitioned the federal district court to vacate
the award.' The district court decided that if Merrill Lynch had
sold short 2,000 shares of stock, they would have violated Rule
10b-4.2" Upon reviewing the arbitrators actions, the court found
that the arbitrators were aware of the rule and ignored it.' The
district court then vacated the award on the grounds that the arbitrators displayed a manifest disregard for the law.0 The court of
appeals reversed.'
After reviewing the minutes of the arbitration, the appellate
court stated that because the arbitrators raised doubts concerning
the validity of the rule, the award did not display a manifest disregard for the law.' The appellate court's decision suggests that as
long as arbitrators merely read the statute, irrespective of whether
the statute is actually applicable, the arbitrators' award will stand
against the manifest disregard standard.0 7 An expanded "judicial
2
review will encourage arbitrators to apply the law correctly." M
If federal courts do not adopt the manifest disregard standard, they must rely on the FAA's regulations.' Under the FAA,
a court cannot review an arbitral award unless the award was either "procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means," or so imper-

194. Id. at 931.

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
20L
202.
20&

Id.
Id.
Id. at 931-32.
Merrill Lynch, 808 F.2d at 931.
Id. at 934.
Id. at 933.
Id.
Id. at 935.
Id. at 935-36

204. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 636 F. Supp.
444, 447 (1986).

205. MerrillLynch, 808 F.2d at 937.
206. Id. at 936-37.
207. Id.
208. Developments in the Law - Employment Discrimination,supra note 77,

at 1691.
209. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
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fectly executed that the award was not mutual, final, or definite.'" 0
The FAA does not allow judicial intervention when an arbitrator is
faced with a dispute of first impression."' The courts also cannot
review an arbitral award to ensure that the award follows precedent. 2' ' Under the FAA, an arbitrator can disregard well estab1
lished laws as long as an award is mutual, final or definite."
Expanding a court's ability to review arbitral awards, exclusively in
areas of employment disputes, will bring uniformity and fair play
to dispute resolutions in the arbitration arena.
An argument against the expansion of judicial review states
that if the courts expand their ability to review arbitral awards,
the number of cases to be decided will steam roll the courts.2 4
However, when correcting problems with the arbitration process,
the courts need not review all arbitration decisions." Judges
should have discretion to review arbitral awards in the employment context.2 8 Incorrect arbitral awards concerning statutory
discrimination claims arising from compulsory arbitration agreements in employment contracts have distressing effects upon the
employer or employee. 21" A discretionary review would create an
incentive for arbitrators to apply statutes correctly, and allow
judges to control the level of the court's review.
CONCLUSION

This Comment does not suggest that the federal policy promoting arbitration should be thwarted. On the contrary, this
Comment suggests that by expanding judicial review to discrimination claims arising from compulsory arbitration agreements in
employment contracts, employers and employees will be encouraged to use arbitration. When prospective employees are required
to choose between their right to a judicial remedy and an opportunity for employment, the prospective employee is placed at a
disadvantage. This disadvantage along with others arising from
compulsory arbitration can be minimized through discretionary
judicial review. Even though the number of arbitrated employment statutory claims may increase, a discretionary judicial review will protect the courts from being overburdened. The courts
210. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
211. Scodro, supra note 30, at 1928.
212. Id. at 1944.
213. 9 U.S.C. § 10.
214. Kolakowski, supra note 121, at 2171-72.
215. Developments in the Law - Employment Discrimination,supra note 77,
at 1676-77.

216. Id.

217. See Hoffman, supra note 16, at 155 (citing a report from the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations that recommends that
"binding arbitration agreements should not be enforceable as a condition of
employment").
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can then assume their traditional roles of ensuring that statutes
are applied correctly.

